Remainders  From and After  Life Estates in Maryland by Howard, Edward G.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 4 Article 1
Remainders "From and After" Life Estates in
Maryland
Edward G. Howard
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward G. Howard, Remainders "From and After" Life Estates in Maryland, 8 Md. L. Rev. 269 (1944)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/1
Maryland Law Review
VOLUME VIII JUNE, 1944 NUMBER 4
REMAINDERS "FROM AND AFTER" LIFE
ESTATES IN MARYLAND
By EDWARD G. HOWAD*
Determination of the quality of a remainder as vested
or contingent is ordinarily the vital step, and often the only
step, in ascertaining who shall take what under a legacy
or trust. It deserves the attention of lawyers and the
circumspection of courts; and it requires more careful
analysis in terms of specific problems than it has received
in most jurisdictions.
The present article is an attempt at such an analysis:
The Maryland decisions as to the quality of certain remain-
ders-in common with those of other states-conflict
among themselves in an embarrassingly clear-cut fashion.'
What is needed is not new principles, but an understanding
of the manner in which entirely adequate principles have
become confused. It is the thesis of this article, in general,
that the Maryland Court of Appeals has overburdened it-
self by excessive insistence on "construction" of wills, and
that having committed itself to one construction, it has re-
emphasized it in other will cases to the detriment of other
testators' purposes.2
Classification of remainders as vested or contingent is
not always subject to difficulties. If property is limited
to A for life and then to those of A's children who are living
* B. S., 1939, Pennsylvania; LL. B., 1942, Harvard. Of the Delaware and
Maryland Bars.
I See the diffident remarks of Pearce, J., in Poultney v. Tiffany, 112 Md.
630, 633, 77 A. 117, 118 (1910).
2 Much of the uncertainty in the Maryland law has resulted, anomalously,
from the reluctance of the Court of Appeals to violate stare deoisif as ap-
plied to constructions professedly unique. Compare the discussion in Grace
v. Thompson, 169 Md. 653, 182 A. 573 (1936).
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at his death, the remainder is contingent.$ The remainder
is equally clearly vested when the limitation is to A for
life, then to B if he attain 21; but if he fail to attain 21,
over." But even within the province of strict legal rules,
uncertainty pervades many situations. What, for example,
should be the answer of a conscientious American lawyer
as to the quality of a remainder expressed as "to A for life,
then to B if he survive A; if he do not, to C"?5
This familiar obscurity is intensified when the difficul-
ties of construction are added. "Construction," to be sure,
has uses as legitimate as those of any rule of law. Rules
are lifeless until facts to fit them can be discovered, and
discovery of facts in wills often depends on the construc-
tion of words susceptible to more than one interpretation.
Nevertheless, since construction is the merest means to an
end, courts must confine it to its just limits. It must not
take on a latitude "boundless in its range, and pernicious
in its consequences" that may overturn "the great land
marks of property."'  Above all, it must not exist for its
own sake.
When a draftsman desires to limit successive gifts of
property "to A for life" and "to B in fee," he ordinarily
uses some connective in bridging the verbal gap between
the two. It may be "and then." It may be "thereafter."
More often than might be supposed, it may be "from and
after the death of A." Whatever the formula, some adverb
or phrase is almost necessary to indicate the temporal rela-
tion of the immediate gift and the future interest.
The law as to such simple remainders is as clear as the
testator's intent: If he desired vesting only at the death of
A, the remainder will be contingent until that time; if not,
it will vest at once.7 In other words, the legal consequences
of such a limitation in its simplest form theoretically rest
3 Cf. Lansdale v. Linthicum, 139 Md. 155, 115 A. 116 (1921) ; see GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITiES (4th ed., 1942) §108.
' Edwards v. Hammond, 3 Lev. 132, 83 Eng. Rep. 614 (C. P. 1683). But
cf. Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889).
I Compare Doe dem. Planner v. Scudamore, 2 B. & P. 289, 126 Eng. Rep.
1287 (C. P. 1800), with Parker v. Ross, 69 N. H. 213, 45 A. 576 (1898).
'Dorsey, C. J., in Home v. Lyeth, 4 H. & J. 431, 435 (Md. 1818).
'Because "the law favors vested interests," if for no other reason.
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entirely on the construction to be given the connective.
Occasionally a decision based on nothing more can be
isolated.
Logically there should be no difference between a
simple "then," most innocuous of adverbs, and such a
phrase as "from and after the death of A" in their effect
on the vesting of a subsequent remainder, since neither
does more than indicate a time after which a legal relation
is to change. But it is doubtful whether any court ever
held contingent a remainder reading "then to B," without
more; whereas many courts-including those of Maryland
-have found difficulty in dealing with a remainderman
whose property comes to him "from and after" the death of
another.8
It is submitted that the rule properly applicable to re-
mainders supported by life estates and preceded by some
such connective is that stated by Sir W. Page Wood, V. C.: I
"1... where there is a limitation over, which, though
expressed in the form of a contingent limitation, is, in
fact, dependent upon a condition essential to the deter-
mination of the interests previously limited, the Court
is at liberty to hold that, notwithstanding the words
in form import contingency, they mean... that the
person to take under the limitation over is to take sub-
ject to the interests so previously limited."
Any other rule, unless under a thoroughly mediaeval sys-
tem of future interests, would seem difficult to justify.
8 Most of the "from and after" cases are collected in Note (1936) 103 A.
L. R. 598.
9 Maddison v. Chapman, 4 K. & J. 709, 719, 70 Eng. Rep. 294, 298, 299
(Ch. 1858), aff'd 3 De G. & J. 536, 44 Eng. Rep. 1375 (C. A. 1859). Pro-
fessor Kales expressed the rule more succinctly: ". . courts have always
read the words 'after the death of A' and similar expressions as if they
were 'at the termination (whenever and in whatever manner it may
occur) of -the particular estate of freehold'." KAT , ESTATES, FUTURE IN-
TERESTS, rC. IN ILLINOIS (2d ed., 1920) §330; see 1 SImEs, FUTURE INTER-
EsTs (1936) §74; In re Browne's Will Trusts, [1915] 1 Ch. 690, 695; cf.
Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jac. 415, 79 Eng. Rep. 355 (K. B. 1617).
The common-sense attitude toward these connective formulae was ex-
pressed by Judge Constable in the Maryland Court of Appeals. A will de-
vised land to A for life, "and after her death" to B and C for life, "and
after all three of their deaths" to be divided between the children of B
and X. In holding the remainder to the children vested, it was said: "We
cannot see that these words indicate anything more than . ..future pos-
session and enjoyment." Martin v. Cook, 129 Md. 195, 199, 98 A. 489, 490
(1916).
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The logic of reading contingency into a requirement that
the remainder await the death of the life tenant vanished
utterly with the tortious feoffment. 10 And the inconve-
niences of unnecessary contingent remainders are obvious.
The Maryland case most violently opposed to this rule
and the equitable considerations which vivify it is Cher-
bonnier v. Goodwin." There personalty was bequeathed
in trust for A for life, "and from and after the death" of
A to be divided among all the children of A. Two children
were born after the date of the will and one of them pre-
deceased A. The court held that since the remainder was
contingent during A's lifetime, the personal representative
of the deceased child took nothing.
Except for the "from and after," the limitation in the
Cherbonnier case is one of the conventional means of grant-
ing a remainder that will vest in the life tenant's children
at birth, subject only to partial divestment on the birth of
other children.12 It is remarkable, therefore, that the Court
could hold the mere presence of the "from and after" clause
sufficient not only to weaken, but completely to subvert
the stock case. The extent of the Court's reasoning is sum-
marized in one sentence by Briscoe, J.:
"The words 'from and after' . . . clearly indicate
... the intention of the testatrix to postpone the vest-
ing of the legacy until after the death of" A.'
The Court cites two Maryland cases as "decisive" of the
Cherbonnier case: Bailey v. Love'! and Larmour v. Rich.5
It is important to determine the extent of the support these
cases give to the proposition that they compel, or even
suggest, the Cherbonnier decision.
Bailey v. Love involved a gift of residue in trust to pay
a fixed annuity to A for life, "and from and after the death"
10 For which see KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS, ETC. IN ILLINOIS (2d
ed. 1920) §46.
11 79 Md. 55, 28 A. 894 (1894).
12 Middleton v. Messenger, 5 Ves. Jun. 136, 31 Eng. Rep. 511 (Ch. 1799)
(the leading case).
21 79 Md. 55, 59, 28 A. 894, 895.
1 67 Md. 592, 11 A. 280 (1887).
" 71 Md. 369, 18 A. 702 (1889).
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of A, to pay the full income to A's children for life, "and
from and after the death of any child," his share in fee to
his child or children. But if any of the children of A should
die without children or the descendants of such children,",
then over to charity. B, one of A's children, had two
children, one of whom died in the lifetime of B. The ques-
tion presented was whether the widower of the dead child
could claim a spouse's share in her legacy. The Court very
properly held that he could not, and awarded B's full share
to her surviving child.
This distribution of the gift necessitated a holding that
the remainders to A's grandchildren were contingent."
The Court relied principally on the gift over to charity in
the event of any of A's children dying without issue, as
making "the intention of the testator transparent" in favor
of contingency, 8 since he wished the charity to take if
there were no blood relatives at hand to inherit when the
life tenants died. Indeed, Tayloe v. Mosher 9 was distin-
guished on the ground that it contained no such gift over.
This reasoning by necessary implication construes the "die
without children or descendants of children" as meaning
"die without issue living at the death" of A's children,
which would of course require a postponement of vesting
until the ascertainment of the class at the death of the life
tenants. That this was the view taken by the Court is
further indicated by its reliance on the decision of Lord
Hardwicke in Billingsley v. Wills,2" where closely similar
remainders were held contingent on the ground that the
1" The will used "issue" instead of "children."
7 The Court might have considered the possibility of holding the re-
mainders vested subject to divestment by the death of the remaindermen
In the lives of the life tenants, an interpretation established in Maryland
and elsewhere. cf., e. g., Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 A. 227 (1893) ; In
re Rogers' Trust Estate, 97 Md. 674, 55 A. 679 (1903). The divesting
suggested would have to be twofold: In favor of surviving children, as
in the Rogers case, supra; or, if there were none such, in favor of the
charity. It may be that such an elaborate interpretation was properly
discarded by the Court as too artificial. In either case, the contention
that the "from and after" has no effect on the quality of the remainders
remains unaffected. The Rogers case has been overruled on a point of
acceleration, but was at the same time approved as to construction of the
remainders, Keen v. Brooks, 47 A. 2d 67 (Md. 1946).
28 67 Md. 592, 599, 11 A. 280, 282.19 29 Md. 443 (1868).
103 Atk. 219, 26 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch. 1745).
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testator intended gifts to those children only who survived
the life tenant.21
This holding is inescapably required by the limitations
of the will in the Bailey case. When the testator limited
the fee over on the death of A's children without children
or the descendants of such children, he contemplated the
possibility of the birth of grandchildren and their subse-
quent deaths in the lives of A's children. In that case,
assuming they left no descendants, the testator wished the
charity to take. Otherwise, if the gifts to the grandchildren
of A had been intended to vest indefeasibly at birth, the
substitutional gifts to the descendants of such grand-
children would be meaningless. Substitutional gifts to the
descendants of grandchildren, though not expressly stated,
are necessarily implied by the mention of such descend-
ants, since it could not be held, consistent with the refer-
ence, that the testator could have intended the charity to
take in case A's children died in A's lifetime, but left de-
scendants who survived A.
Looked at in another way, the remainders to A's grand-
children seem equally clearly contingent, again without
reference to the "from and after." The gift over, by its
terms, must have taken effect had neither of B's children
survived her without leaving surviving descendants; yet
survival of one child would prevent the charity from ever
inheriting, since he would be one of the described class of
remaindermen who are to take ahead of the charity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court was required to hold that the
fixing of ultimate remainder rights in the property could
not take place until the death of B.
None of these considerations was present in the Cher-
bonnier case. In deciding the Bailey case, the Court care-
fully noted that the "from and after" did not enforce a
holding of contingency, 2 but considered that it carried a
certain weight in favor of contingency in the circumstances
$I "Lord Hardwicke considered that, by younger sons . . . [the testator
meant] . . . those who should answer that description at the death of"
the life tenant. Tribe v. Newland, 5 De G. & Sm. 236, 238, 64 Eng. Rep.
1097 (Ch. 1852). Billingsley v. Wills is a "from and after" case.$267 Md. 592, 602, 11 A. 280, 283. The Cherbonnier case completely dis-
regarded this statement.
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of that case, as, indeed, almost any words would have. The
will was so phrased, regardless of the "from and after," as
to preclude any possibility of vesting of the remainder in
question.28
Larmour v. Rich,24 the other case cited as "decisive" of
the issues raised in the Cherbonnier case, is even more
clearly inapposite. There a deed reserved an equitable life
estate in leasehold property to the grantor, then bequeathed
a life estate to his daughter, Rebecca;
"and from and immediately after the decease of the
said Rebecca... then in trust that the... [property]
... shall descend to and become the property of the
children... Rebecca... now hath... [or] ... may
hereafter have."
The deed then provided a gift over on the event of Rebec-
ca's death "without leaving a child or children... living
at the time of her death...." The grantor's will bequeathed
$70,000 residue to his seven daughters in terms almost ex-
actly similar to those of the inter vivos trust. 5  Although
the Court discussed the will and the deed together, the con-
troversy concerned only the quality of the remainders
granted by deed to Rebecca's children.
This controversy is easily determined. The existence
of the gift over contingent on Rebecca's leaving no children
"living at the time of her death" amplifies the original
simple limitation to the children "from and immediately
after" their mother's death so that it must read as if it
were to "surviving" children. The gift over will vest in
possession if Rebecca leaves no surviving children; there-
fore the death of Rebecca is the first time when it can be
determined positively whether Rebecca's children or the
taker in default of children will inherit under the terms
23 The scope of this article excludes a discussion as to the applicability of
the Rule against Perpetuities. It would appear, however, that the ultimate
remainders involved were void as to A's grandchildren born to any after-
born child of A. But under the separability doctrine these remainders
were valid as to A's grandchildren born to the children of A who were
lives in being, Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare 372, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (1853).
,71 Md. 369, 18 A. 702 (1889).
58 The comparable gift over in the will was on the event of the daugh-
ters' dying "without leaving a child or children or descendants of the
same living."
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of the deed. The remainders are therefore mere variants
on the stock contingency of "to A for life, then to his sur-
viving children, "26 and the decision could not have been
otherwise.
The language used by the Court, however, in large
measure obscures the fundamental simplicity of the words
of the trust. McSherry, J., talked at some length, for ex-
ample, about the strong flavor of contingency inherent in
the words "descend to and become the property of" the
daughter's children, following the "from and after" clause.
He reasoned that the grantor must have intended the re-
mainders to be contingent until the life tenant's death be-
cause, obviously, the property could not "descend to" or
"become the property of" the children until that eventY.2
This misconstruction of a conveyancer's gesture, which is
merely a description of the process the grantor desired,
rather than a qualification of that process, is all the more
unfortunate in that it was unnecessary to the decision of
the case. The remainders were uncompromisingly con-
tingent without it. The Court did not discuss the effect of
the "from and after" clause except as it bore on the "descend
to." It is evident, therefore, that the decision in Larmour
v. Rich should have had no effect, as a, precedent, on the
Cherbonnier case.
Poultney v. Tiffany28 amply demonstrates the iniquity
of such careless or mistaken dicta as those in the Larmour
case. The gift was in trust to the testator's wife for life,
"and in trust that from and immediately after the
death of my wife, this trust shall cease, and the prop-
erty shall then become the property of all my children,
in equal shares...."
The Court held the remainders contingent. In essence,
Pearce, J., felt himself bound by Larmour v. Rich because
of the testator's designation of his wife's death as the time
when the trust should cease and the property should "then
become" that of his children. The Cherbonnier case was
11 Cf. note 3, supra.
2T 71 Md. 369, 382, 18 A. 702, 703.
" 112 Md. 630, 77 A. 117 (1910).
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cited for good measure. Thus the incorrect dictum asso-
ciated with a correct holding has mistakenly become de-
cisive, and has resulted in an incorrect holding, for which
additional support has been drawn from a wrong holding
based on a misreading of two correct cases. The cumula-
tion of error that began with the Cherbonnier case has
reached, in Poultney v. Tiffany, proportions large enough
to influence seriously the course of future decision in Mary-
land. The quality of any future remainder which is intro-
duced by some reference to the termination of a preceding
life estate will be in doubt.
Notwithstanding that the court in Poultney v. Tiffany
considered it "idle" to attempt to reconcile all the cases
in point, even from a single jurisdiction,29 it proceeded to
distinguish Cox v. Handy30 from the facts before it. Cox
v. Handy involved a life estate to the testator's wife; "after"
her death the property to be divided among the testator's
named children, with a substitutional gift to the issue of
deceased children. The remainders were held vested in
the children subject to divestment in favor of their issue
on the death of children in the life tenant's life.31 Pearce,
J., distinguished the case on the ground that the remainder-
men were named, thereby making a novel contribution to
the law of remainders which is not likely to be followed." -
He also pointed out that McSherry, J., who wrote the opin-
ion in Larmour v. Rich, participated in Cox v. Handy, and
declared that "no one ... can for a moment suppose..."
that the learned judge believed he abetted in the overrul-
ing of the Larmour case by going along with the court in
2 112 Md. 630, 633, 77 A. 117, 118.
O 78 Md. 108, 27 A. 227 (1893).
S1 Maryland cases treating remainders limited to begin "after" the death
of a life tenant are logically on an equal footing with the "from and after"
cases. Such remainders have almost invariably been held vested, begin-
ning with Keerl v. Fulton, 1 Md. Ch. 532 (1850). Accord, inter alia,
Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 A. 146 (1890) ; Martin v. Cook, 129 Md.
195, 98 A. 489 (1916). Contra: Reilly v. Bristow, 105 Md. 326, 66 A. 262(1907) (Pearce, J., relying on the Larmour and Cherbonnier cases). Straus
v. Rost, 67 Md. 465, 10 A. 74 (1887), though it speaks of remainders "after"
the life tenant's remarriage as "contingent," Is consistent with divestment
on the death of the remainderman before that event.
An example of a vested remainder beginning "at" the death of another
is to be found in Wilson v. Pichon, 162 Md. 199, 159 A. 766 (1932).
32 Statistically, probably most vested remaindermen are unnamed chil-
dren. Cf. the cases cited In note 31, supra.
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Cox v. Handy. 3 It may be assumed that these remarkable
efforts to avoid the effect of Cox v. Handy were made in
mistaken loyalty to the principle of stare decisis as applied
to a dictum. That language in part "coincident" with that
in the Larmour case did not necessarily require the same
holding, even under the most rigorous application of stare
decisis, does not appear to have suggested itself.
There exists a class of cases in Maryland wherein re-
mainders clearly contingent for other reasons have been
so held with reliance, sometimes exclusive, on the phrase
"from and after the death of A," rather than on the more
obvious contingencies presented by the respective wills."'
In Lee v. O'Donnell35 for example, the remainders were
limited "from and immediately after" the life tenant's
death, to the child or children he "may leave living at the
time of his death". Yet with this strongest of contin-
gencies--determination of the class-before it, the Court
chose to emphasize the effect of the introductory clause as
though it had some cabalistic significance. Mercantile
Trust & Deposit Co. v. Brown80 is precisely similarY
Cherbannier v. Goodwin was again relied on, in a most
peculiar way, in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Carey.38 There
the testatrix left the residue of her estate to her husband
for life, and "from and immediately after" his death to
her daughter, if she should then be living, with successive
substitutional gifts to the daughter's issue and next of kin,
in the event that she predeceased her father. The daughter
died without issue in the husband's life, and the husband
claimed the fee as sole next of kin. The issue before the
Court would seem to have been whether the testatrix in-
"3 112 Md. 630, 637, 77 A. 117, 119.
"' That this condition is not confined to Maryland, cf., e. g., Wunderlich
v. Bleyle, 96 N. J. Eq. 135, 125 A. 386 (1924) (remainders to children "then
living" "from and after" death of life tenants).
5 95 Md. 538, 52 A. 979 (1902).
"6 71 Md. 166, 17 A. 937 (1889).
"' The gift "from and after" the life tenant's death was to such of the
life tenant's children or descendants of children "as may be living at the
time this one-seventh part is intended to vest." The Court correctly fol-
lowed Bailey v. Love, but incorrectly dwelt on the "from and after" clause
in that case rather than the essential contingency of survivorship, and
cited Straus v. Rost, for which see note 31, supra.38 127 Md. 593, 96 A- 796 (1916).
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tended her husband to be included among her daughter's
next of kin;39 that is to say, whether there was any gift to
him beyond the life estate. The Court, however, chose
first to regard the issue as one of the vesting or contingency
of a supposed remainder to the husband, and, on the author-
ity of the Cherbonnier case, declared that the presence of
the "from and immediately after" indicated the testatrix's
intention that the remainder should not vest until the death
of the husband! It was held that the "remainder" to the
husband as next of kin could not "vest" until his death,
hence that he could take nothing.
These dicta and alternative holdings might be dismissed
as inconsequential if they did not have a way of pervading
the law and subtly altering it.4" Their presence in the
reports and their careless repetition from time to time give
the purported rule they represent a spurious appearance
of validity as the rule of the jurisdiction.
The effect of these erroneous decisions and dicta has
been equally pronounced in another direction. Just as
the unjust rigors of the eighteenth century. criminal law
forced courts to make artificial distinctions to mitigate
them, so the existence of cases like Cherbonnier v. Good-
win has led the Court of Appeals to undertake somewhat
devious means of avoiding a holding of contingency in simi-
lar situations. Since the "rule" of such cases, if it exists,
depends on a construction of common adverbial phrases
prefixed to remainders, distinctions have taken the form of
emphasis on other words, which no court would otherwise
often advert to.
Williams v. Armiger41 is an excellent example of this
tendency. A trust deed limited property to A for life,
"and from and after the death" of A, in trust for "all and
every" the children A "now has" or may hereafter have,
89 In an alternative holding, the Court correctly decided that, the legatee's
father was not so included, but spoke of a hu8band as not being among
next of kin, and cited a case so holding.
,0 Other Maryland cases which do not actually decide the point are apt
to give the appearance of assuming that the mere presence of "from and
after" in a will automatically makes the succeeding remainder contingent.
See, e. g., Booth v. Eberly, 124 Md. 22, 26, 91 A. 767, 768 (1914) ; McClurg
v. Myers, 129 Md. 112, 118, 98 A. 491, 493 (1916).
&1129 Md. 222, 98 A. 542 (1916).
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with a substitutional gift to the children of deceased chil-
dren. In a forthright opinion, Thomas, J., pointed out that
the remainders were vested unless the "from and after"
made them contingent. In view of the Poultney case, which
he cited, together with Larmour v. Rich as interpreted
therein, he could hardly hold that the words had no effect
without overruling the earlier decisions. Instead he dis-
tinguished them on the basis of the grantor's intent (which
they professed to follow). The Court therefore held the
remainders vested by saying that the grantor's reference
to the children A "now has" indicated his desire that the
children living at the date the deed took effect should take
vested remainders, subject only to partial divestment on
the birth of other children. The distinction is plainly a
factitious one: A limitation to "the children A now has or
may hereafter have" is essentially no different from a limi-
tation to "A's children," and is just as much a conveyancer's
gesture as "from and after the death of A," which is simi-
larly equivalent to "then." Yet if the Williams and Poult-
ney cases are to stand together, the testator or grantor who
limits a gift "from and after" the death of a life tenant to
"all the children of X ' '42 will have granted contingent re-
mainders; whereas if the wording is to "the children X now
has or may hereafter have," the remainders will be vested.
It is submitted that the difference between the two is with-
out substance.
Seven years later a similar deed was distinguished simi-
larly, again by Thomas, J. In Cole v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co.43 the grantor reserved in himself a life estate in trust,
then granted remainders to named children for life: "And
from and immediately after the death of each of said chil-
dren" in trust to "transfer and assign absolutely" the cor-
pus to the children's children, the descendants of deceased
grandchildren to take their parents' share, should any
grandchild die "without leaving issue," over to his "surviv-
ing" brothers and sisters.
"The words of the will in Poultney v. Tiffany.
143 Md. 90, 121 A. 911 (1923).
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The Court found it "significant" that the grantor used
no words of contingency such as "surviving" in the re-
mainders to the grandchildren, while he did exactly that
in the gift to surviving grandchildren on the event of the
death of some of them without issue. Added to this, the
Court found the grantor's plain intent that all his grand-
children should ultimately receive equal shares of that
part of the corpus from which their parents drew income 4
to be equivalent in effect to the words "now has" in the
Williams case. The remainders were accordingly held
vested. This refinement on the Williams case would seem
to indicate that no more is required than something in
addition to "all the children" to show that a testator really
does mean "all the children." But surely the Court of
Appeals would not insist that he say "all the children, and
I mean all." Actually, the result of the case amounts to
repudiation in practice of the Cherbonnier and Poultney
decisions.
After the decision of the Cole case, it remained for the
Court of Appeals only to recognize in theory what it had
already put into practice. If it had, the whole matter
would have been at an end, and the subtle distinctions of
Thomas, J., would have served their purpose in exposing
the error of the precedents which motivated them. But
Grace v. Thompson,45 the latest case to discuss the matter
thoroughly, does nothing of the sort.
Here there was a gift of income to the testator's wife
for life, and "from and after" her death the property was
to be divided among the testator's brothers and sisters or
their descendants. At the time of executing the will, two
of the testator's sisters and one brother were already dead,
leaving only one sister still alive. The remaining sister
outlived the testator, but died during the wife's life ten-
"ancy. The case turned on whether the sister's will operated
to pass her share of her brother's legacy. The Court held
that it did because the remainder to her vested at the testa-
tor's death.
4" This Intent was explicit in the deed.
"' 169 Md. 653, 182 A. 573 (1936).
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In arriving at this result, however, the Court did almost
nothing to dissipate the pre-existing confusion. From its
careful review of virtually all46 the Maryland "from and
after" cases, for example, the Court arrived at the disap-
pointing conclusion that the presence of the "from and
after" was important, not conclusively,4 7 but "as a signifi-
cant index of the testator's intention."48  Offutt, J., went
on to say that the addition of some such word as "then" to
"from and after" would act to strengthen the "conclusion"
that the testator intended to postpone vesting until the
period of distribution. The Court went on further to con-
trast postponement of vesting "for the convenience of the
estate" and postponement which "annexes futurity to the
substance of the gift,"4 9 thereby suggesting the decision of
future remainder problems in Maryland by means of the
clumsy rhetoric which has troubled other courts ever since
Matter of Crane.50
It would thus appear that the Grace case has produced
no essential alteration in the multi-faceted remainder law
of Maryland. Indeed, it established a facet or two of its
own. Relatively inconsequential words, artificially related
to the testator's "intent," remain the determinative criteria
for Maryland draftsmen. And the Maryland executor who
must administer a remainder limited to come into posses-
sion "from and after" the death of a life tenant is as much
at a loss as to whom to pay as he ever was. If the estate is
at all substantial, he will almost certainly have to ask the
Court to ascertain the testator's "intention."'51
" 'With the conspicuous exception of Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428,
144 A. 367 (1929), for which see infra, Circa notes 53-60.
" It would appear that this concession alone overrules Cherbonnier v.
Goodwin by implication. The Court, however, professed to regard the
Cherbonnier case as one of a number of authoritative Maryland decisions.
'a 169 Md. 653, 663, 182 A. 573, 577.
,o 169 Md. 653, 663, 666, 182 A. 573, 577, 579. This was only partly in
reference to the "divide and pay over" provision of the will, being equally
directed at the "from and after" clause.
50 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47 (1900) ; see Note Developments in the Law-
Future Interests-1932-1934 (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1202, 1218.
" The Court In Grace v. Thompson found the Maryland cases "in no
sense harmonious," but resolved them by reference to the principle of the
testator's intent that it discovered "running through" them. 169 Md. 653,
664, 665, 182 A. 573, 578. The principle is of course valid. The disharmony
nevertheless remains because of the diverse subsidiary means employed in
arriving at that ultimate principle.
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If this, then, is a true statement of the effect of the
present Maryland law, what can be expected in the future,
when next such a remainder comes, as it will,5 2 before the
Court of Appeals? It seems clear, first of all, that a restate-
ment of principle, in one form or another, will be virtually
forced on the Court to take the place of the rules, cross-
rules, and exceptions that have piled up in the reports. The
opportunity that was declined in the Grace case will again
demand acceptance. In what manner it will be accepted,
in what direction restatement will go, depends entirely
on the Court; the Maryland precedents are so divergent
as to compel no one course and to permit several. It is sub-
mitted that the way to establishment of a valid and work-
able rule in Maryland is easy.
Fundamentally, only two holdings obstruct the way.
The first, Cherbonnier v. Goodwin, has been shown to be
based on a misreading of two correct Maryland cases. It
should not be difficult to withhold recognition explicitly
from such a case; to apply stare decisis to an error of this
sort is to deny it to the correct cases the error rests on.
Poultney v. Tiffany, similarly, is based on fidelity to an in-
correct dictum, and should be accorded no more weight
than the dictum itself. It has been pointed out, moreover,
that the Poultney case cannot logically stand together with
the later case of Williams v. Armiger 3 Such correct hold-
ings as the Williams and Cole cases, which are constrained
to employ verbal subterfuge to avoid the effect of the Cher-
bonnier and allied cases, could easily be explained and
strengthened, minus their verbal trappings.
All this is negative, a sort of peeling down to a neutral
basis on which a positive rule can be built. The material
for building such a rule is plentiful. Well considered cases
are numerous in other jurisdictions, to the effect that re-
mainders in form dependent on a condition essential to the
"A "from and after" remainder appeared before the Court of Appeals
in December, 1944, though the issues of the case did not necessitate a
determination of Its quality. Sabit v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 40 A.
2d. 231 (1944); Cf. Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 336, 24 A.
2d. 299 (1942). The Court In the Robinson case held vested a remainder
beginning "at" the death of a life tenant, but felt it necessary to dis-
tinguish Poultney v. Tiffany on the use of the word "then."
" See supra, crca notes 42-3.
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determination of the particular estate are vested.54 Mary-
land cases already discussed are helpful. And, in addition,
at least one Maryland "from and after" case is squarely in
point.
Cowman v. Classen55 is relatively recent, but little no-
ticed. It was not cited in Grace v. Thompson. 6  It does
not appear in the annotation appended to the Grace case.57
The Cowman case involved a gift in trust to the testator's
wife for life "and from and after the death of my wife
then.., in trust for" the testator's daughter for life. Alter-
nate contingent remainders were provided at the termina-
tion of the daughter's estate, one or the other to take effect
depending on whether the daughter died with or without
issue. The will also granted the daughter a testamentary
power exercisable only on her death without issue. The
daughter predeceased the wife without issue, leaving a will
purporting to exercise the power. The principal conten-
tion presented was that the purported exercise of the power
was invalid. The Court held it valid, and in so doing
defined the estate the daughter had taken in these words:
"The remainder to the daughter was not made con-
tingent.., by its being subject to a precedent equitable
life estate in the mother.. .. "58
It is notable that the Court held the remainder vested, not
only despite the preceding "from and after," but also in
"' A good example of these cases is Tribe v. Newland, 5 De G. & Sm. 236,
64 Eng. Rep. 1097 (Ch. 1852). For additional cases see 1 SiMEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS (1936) §74.
"156 Md. 428, 144 A. 367 (1929).
"Offutt, J., who wrote the opinion in the Grace case, was a member of
the Court which decided Cowman v. Classen.
57 Note (1936) 103 A. L. R. 598. Although the Cowman case involves a
"from and after" remainder, the headnotes In both the Maryland Reports
and Atlantic Reporter quote the will as creating a remainder "after" the
termination of the life estate.
51 156 Md. 428, 438, 144 A. 367, 371. The holding that the remainder to
the daughter was vested in interest seems to have been necessary to the
decision of the case. A power in gross, permitting appointment of a vested
remainder, to a living contingent remainderman, and exercisable notwith-
standing the happening of the contingency, would be at the least a unique
legal curiosity. Cf. Christian v. Wilson's Ex'rs, 153 Va. 614, 151 S. E. 300
(1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 840 (1930) (widow's renunciation held to
have destroyed power); Fortescue v. Jobson, Hetil. 90, 124 Eng. Rep. 366
(C. P. 1629).
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the face of an introductory "then. ' 59  Here, then, is a Mary-
land case which obliterates-though implicitly-the effect
of Cherbonnier v. Goodwin and Poultney v. Tiffany.
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals can on the
basis of this case strike down the bad and activate the good
in the Maryland law. Support for the result can easily be
secured from the numerous Maryland cases holding as
vested remainders beginning "after" the death of a life
tenant.61 Ultimately, all that is required is willingness to
disregard the supposed metaphysical properties of a hand-
ful of common adverbs.61
9 Compare the dictum emphasizing the contingent effect of "then" under
these circumstances in Grace v. Thompson, 169 Md. 653, 663-664, 182 A. 573,
577. See Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co., note 52 supra.
80 Some of these cases are cited in note 31, supra. Martin v. Cook, dis-
cussed in note 9, supra, is especially persuasive. Additional cases in ac-
cord are: Lark v. Linstead, 2 Md. 420 (1852) ; Branson v. Hill, 31 Md. 181
(1869) ; Hoover v. Smith 96 Md. 393, 54 A. 102 (1903).
11 Two recent Maryland cases may indicate such a willingness to dis-
regard the "effect" of a "from and after" clause. In Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Sanford, 181 Md. 271, 29 A. 2d. 657 (1943), a trust beneficiary's in-
terest was held vested, though by the terms of the gift the interest was
not to "vest in" the beneficiary until "from and after" the expiration of a
term of years. It has been suggested that interim gifts of income justified
the result. See Jones, Vested and Contingent Renainders (1943) 8 Md. L.
Rev. 1, 11, n. 26.
In Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 178 Md. 52, 12 A. 2d. 208 (1940),
a "from and after" remainder, clearly contingent by reason of a survivor-
ship condition, was held vested. Reference to the briefs indicates that both
parties conceded the remainder to be contingent.
